The number of merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions paid for fully in stock in the U.S. market 
In the past 25 years, U.S. merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions that have been fully paid in stock have displayed a striking pattern: about half of all transactions featured this payment approach during the 1990s, but the percentage of fully stock-paid transactions has fallen to around 10% in recent years (value-based percentages). We investigate the causes of this long-term evolution.
Research into payment mode choices in M&A transactions has been very active in corporate finance, offering a fertile ground for testing theories and developing a modern view of the firm. Betton et al. (2008) identify four factors that drive payment mode choices: taxes (Section 368 of the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code), information asymmetries (Eckbo et al. 1990; Fishman 1989; Hansen 1987) , capital structure and control (Harris and Raviv 1988; Stulz 1988) , and agency-based and behavioral arguments (Jensen 2005; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 2004; Shleifer and Vishny 2003) .
Considerable empirical literature also has tested these proposed models and their predictions. For example, in early research, Travlos (1987) established that equity transaction announcements generated negative market reactions of about 1% for public target companies. Fuller et al. (2002) show that market reactions to stock-paid transactions depend on the consideration offered but also on the target's status, such that they generate positive market reactions if the target is a private company.
The long-term marginalization of fully stock-paid M&A transactions offers a unique context for testing whether classic payment mode theories represent first-order drivers of payment mode choice.
To explain the shift in balance toward more cash payments, some of these determinants must have undergone a significant evolution, so identifying them could provide an ex post confirmation of their importance. Boone et al. (2014) seek to do so using a predictive model of payment mode choice, built on many determinants from extant literature, but their model can only partially explain the observed time trend in M&A payment modes. These authors also note that other variables could be correlated by coincidence with the evolution in payment modes, so "propensities (to use mixed payments and stock) cannot be explained by our measures designed to capture traditional theories for the payment choice" (Boone et al. 2014, p. 297) . Identifying the main driver of the marginalization of full stock payments in the U.S. thus remains an open issue. and 142 were adopted in 2001, which dropped the pooling method of accounting for M&A transactions and the goodwill amortization principle, respectively. The pooling method of accounting, based on Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion 16 from 1970, consists of the simple addition of the income and balance sheet items to produce new statements out of the merged entities. The purchase method instead imposes a reevaluation of the target's assets and liabilities at fair value and the recognition of goodwill if a difference exists between the paid price and the reevaluated net assets. If they opted for pooling, 1 acquirers could avoid penalizing effects on their financial ratios due to their acquisitions, such earning per share (EPS), return on equity (ROE), or return on assets (ROA) (see Reda, 1999) . The synchronicity between the sharp drop in the evolution of fully stock-paid M&A transaction frequency ( Figure 1 ) and the adoption of SFAS 141 and 142 is questioning. It suggests that these adoption of the standards can help explain the marginalization of full stock payments in U.S.
M&A transactions. Ali and Kravet (2014) contribute to this suspicion. In studying the role of the Step-Up-or the difference between the purchase price and the target's book value of net assets-for explaining payment mode choices before and after a 2001 reform, they find that a higher
Step-Up causes the purchase method to impose greater penalties on the newly merged entity's financial performance. The
Step-Up thus helps explain the choice of stock-for-stock financing before 2001, but it cannot do so afterwards. Ali and Kravet (2014) posit that pooling has driven stock-for-stock financing before 2001. In the specific case of AT&T's acquisition of NCR, Lys and Vincent (1995) note that AT&T decided to pay fully in stock, to qualify for pooling. But in the absence of a counterfactual, this inference may be misleading. The adoptions of SFAS 141 and 142 were one-time experiences, and around them, many synchronous events may have had an effect. Nearly any variable displaying a structural break after 2001 could appear to be a statistically significant determinant of the evolution in full stock payments. 2 For example, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, the U.S. Federal Reserve drastically lowered its federal fund target rate, to avoid an economic recession. This change in interest rate policy affected the cost of raising cash to finance M&A transactions. The bursting of the Internet bubble also was contemporaneous with SFAS 141 and 142 and strongly affected M&A market activity, especially in high-tech industries, and stock paid transactions are known to be more frequent in high growth industries (Eckbo et al., 2015) . Therefore, to test whether the rules abolishing pooling exerted an effect, we need an identification strategy.
To apply one, we use Canada as a counterfactual for the U.S. Before 2001, under the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) Handbook Section 1580, pooling was also allowed. In 2001, as in the US, this possibility was abolished under CICA Handbook Section 1581. Moreover, the U.S.
and Canadian economies are closely tied, so Canada is a prime candidate to serve as a counterfactual, as Eckbo (1992) suggested in his effort to identify a possible deterrence effect of M&A regulations. In support of this valid identification strategy though, we note that the U.S. and Canadian conditions for pooling, before its abolishment, differed substantially. In the Canadian case, under CICA Handbook Section 1580, pooling was allowed only if one of the parties could not be identified readily as the acquirer. This strict restriction led to very limited uses of pooling during the 1990s. Accordingly, the abolishment of pooling in Canada would likely have, at best, a very limited impact on incentives to opt for stock as a payment medium. In a sense, pooling abolishment in Canada acts as a placebo for the "medication" of pooling abolishment in the U.S. Recently, Cedergren et al. (2015) also use Canada as a counterfactual for the US experience to control for endogeneity concerns in their study of the relation between goodwill amortization abolishment and acquisition profitability and risk.
For our baseline analyses, we collected two large M&A transaction samples, one for the U.S.
and one for Canada, from the Thomson SDC database for the 1990-2014 period. We used identical selection criteria: deal size above USD1 million, public acquirers (no restriction on target status), a ratio of deal value to acquirer size of at least 1%, exchange offers, acquisition of assets, acquisition of certain assets, buybacks, recaps and acquisition (of stock) excluded, the percentage of shares acquired between 50% and 100%, 100% of shares held after the transaction, the consideration offered reported in the Thomson SDC database, and financial acquirers (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) excluded. The samples comprise 6,955 U.S. and 1,712 Canadian transactions.
We start by reporting stylized facts about payment mode choices over the 25-year period. As Figure 1 highlights, full stock payments declined abruptly after 2001 in the U.S., but that was not the case in Canada, as confirmed by a Chow test of the structural break. After providing the descriptive statistics for a set of traditionally observed determinants of M&A payment choices, we estimate a linear probability model for stock payment choices in the U.S. and Canada. The results confirm that the data sets are comparable to previous studies; we find similar historical results.
For the main analysis, we use a difference-in-differences test, which is robust to many potential sources of bias (Roberts and Whited, 2013) , and merge the U.S. and Canadian samples. We identify pooling and post-pooling abolishment (hereinafter post) periods, then test whether full stock payments declined significantly more in the U.S. than in Canada during the post period. They did; this result is highly statistically significant, such that the probability of opting for full stock payments shrank by more than 20 percentage points (pp) (or 30 pp, depending on the difference-in-differences specification) in the U.S. during the post period, compared with Canada.
Among the additional analyses we provide, we investigate why an accounting rule change might have had such a significant impact on the M&A market. If displayed financial performance is important for CEOs (who are key decision makers in M&A processes; Harding and Rovit 2004) , then the abolishment of pooling should have had a stronger influence on payment choices when CEO incentives were a stronger function of firm performances. Our results support this prediction, indicating that displayed financial performance matters for CEOs. Through this channel, pooling abolishment could have affected the mode of payment choice. In contrast, when we investigate the combined evolution of classic determinants as a means to explain the evolution of full stock payments, we find strong evidence against this effect, according to a comparison of their predictive power between the U.S. and Canada in the post period. This result corroborates the mixed results reported by Boone et al. (2014) . We also study whether, in the U.S., the acquirers who selected full stock payments changed between the pooling and the post periods. Indeed, we find that after 2001, acquirers paying in stock were smaller and more leveraged, owned more tangible assets, distributed dividends more often, and more frequently entered international transactions targeting public firms. By underlining the real change in acquirers' profiles and the characteristics of full stock payment transactions after the abolishment of pooling, we corroborate the material impacts of this abolishment on the M&A market.
As another complementary investigation, we test whether U.S. deals that probably would have used pooling, if it were still allowed, were paid in stock during the post period. They were not though, providing further evidence that pooling represented a motivation to pay in stock during the 1990s. The last additional analysis addresses the value consequences of the abolishment for U.S. acquirers. With a reduced but still sizable sample of 5,148 transactions, we determined that acquirers' cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the announcement of a stock-paid M&A transaction fell by 4.63 pp for public targets in the post period compared with the pooling period. This value effect is highly significant, both economically and statistically. We also provide the results of a long list of robustness checks for the baseline analysis, such as excluding high-technology firms to control for the Internet bubble, excluding cross-border deals, or using Europe as a counterfactual instead of Canada (among others). As we detail subsequently, all the robustness checks confirmed the baseline results.
With these findings, this article contributes to M&A payment choice literature. The abolishment of pooling offers an interesting setting for judging the relative effectiveness of various theories put forward in finance to explain the acquirer's payment mode choice. Our results highlight that the determinants suggested in traditional finance literature offer only low power for explaining the sharp decline in stock-paid transactions in the U.S. around 2001. The abolishment instead appears to be a first-order factor. Other factors still may have played a role but our results highlight the importance of boosting the displayed financial performance for CEOs. Our results also contribute to financial regulation literature, by showing how far-reaching a change in accounting principles can be for the M&A market in the long run. This insight is critical, considering the weight of the M&A market as a channel for resource allocations (Andrade et al., 2001) , and leads us to recommend great caution when devising any changes to a regulatory framework.
Data
Our baseline M&A data for both the U.S. and Canadian data 3 came from the Thomson SDC database, with a set of selection criteria similar to those used by Betton et al. (2008) :
-Deal size greater than USD1 million.
-Public acquirers (but no restriction on target status).
-Ratio of the deal value to the acquirer size of at least 1%.
-Excluding exchange offers, acquisition of assets, acquisition of certain assets, buybacks, recaps, and acquisition (of stock).
3 Sample sizes vary from analysis to analysis, depending on the control variables and data availability constraints.
-Percentage of shares acquired between 50% and 100%.
-100% of shares held after the transaction.
-The consideration offered was included in the Thomson SDC database.
-Excluding financial acquirers (SIC codes 6000 to 6999). In the U.S. data, the interaction term coefficient also is not statistically significant.
That is, the structural break is driven by a change in level, not slope.
Determinants of Stock Payment
We used a large set of determinants of the M&A mode of payment, as identified by prior M&A literature (Eckbo et al. 2014 But the interaction term coefficients in nonlinear models are not marginal effects and therefore must be interpreted with care (Greene 2010) . The linear probability model is immune to this issue.
As the results in Table 4 indicate, the coefficient estimates for the U.S. sample are close to those reported by Eckbo et al. (2014) : acquirer market-to-book ratio and R&D increase the probability of full stock payments; dividend payments and leverage decrease it. Acquirer size and asset tangibility retain the same signs, but the former loses its significance, and the latter was not significant in Eckbo et al. 7 Despite the compositional differences revealed in Table 3 , our sample thus appears representative of classic samples used in prior M&A literature to study the determinants of payment choice. Finally, the comparison of the multivariate analyses for the U.S. and Canada indicates that all the statistically significant U.S. coefficients retain their signs in the Canadian case (and mostly remain statistically significant). These results confort our decision to use Canada as a counterfactual for the U.S. pooling abolishment experience.
Pooling Interests versus Purchase Accounting Methods
To test whether pooling abolishment drove the marginalization of full stock payments in the U.S., we first summarize the relevant accounting regulations in both nations. This initial analysis is important to understand why Canada is a valid counterfactual, namely, because pooling was possible in Canada before 2001.
The U.S. Case
The SFAS to fulfill (or not) these criteria. The general idea was that pooling should apply to mergers of equals, so the main criteria were autonomy (i.e., merging companies could not be divisions or subsidiaries of one another in the two years before the merger), a single transaction (merger should be a one-step process, completed within a year of its initiation), and an essentially stock-for-stock transaction (at least 90% of the paid price). 10 The method was common for large M&A transactions in the U.S., as Figure 2 displays.
It indicates the average percentage of M&A transactions using pooling with deal sizes greater than USD100 million that were fully paid by stock during 1990-2001 (source: Thomson SDC Database).
Panel A displays count-based percentages, and Panel B contains value-based percentages. Pooling was used seven times (four times) more frequently in the U.S. than in Canada, according to the count-(value-) based percentages. Reda (1999) reports that, in 1997, the dollar volume of pooling exceeded that of purchase by a factor of 20 in the U.S.. Thus, the pooling method was the method of choice for large, U.S., M&A transactions paid for fully by stock.
8 Note that SFAS 141 evolved in 2008 to become SFAS 141R. The purchase method was relabeled the acquisition method, and the changes made the acquisition method less attractive in some circumstances. But according to Ali and Kravet (2014) , this change affected only a small minority of transactions. 9 SFAS 142 replaced goodwill amortization with impairments, based on yearly assessments of goodwill value. 10 The remaining nine criteria imposed strict restrictions on the voting right changes for common stocks.
With this stylized fact, several researchers have considered the relation between pooling and the choice of payment methods, as well as managers' motivations to choose pooling and the value effect for shareholders. Ali and Kravet (2014) use the adoption of SFAS 141 and 142 as a kind of natural experiment to study the relation between accounting regulations and the financing used in M&A transactions. As noted previously, they established a positive relation between the target's Step-Up value and the probability of stock-for-stock financing before 2001. This relation disappeared after the abolishment of pooling and goodwill amortization though, leading the authors to infer that pooling was an important driver of stock-for-stock financing choices. Ayers et al. (2002) confirm that firms using pooling were ready to pay higher acquisition premia. Weber (2004) 
The Canadian Case
Before 2001, Canadian regulations allowed the use of pooling (CICA Handbook Section 1580 11 ), though they were far more restrictive. According to Farrell and Beechy (2002, p. 92) , "if one company can be identified as the acquirer, then there is a widespread agreement that the purchase method should be used." This consensus was the case in cash-paid acquisitions. Even for stock-forstock mergers though, pooling was possible only in mergers of equals. Shareholders of the merging companies agreed in that case to combine and continue both businesses, as an ongoing concern. Pooling therefore was rare. According to André et al. (2004) The Canadian experience is particularly interesting with respect to our research question. The pooling abolishment year is the same as that in the U.S., and the nations are close, with closely tied economic environments (Eckbo 1992; Cedergren et al. 2015) . The very restrictive pooling usage conditions in Canada meant that this approach had, at most, a very limited material impact on the payment choice by construction. These arguments motivate our choice of Canada as a counterfactual for the U.S. experience.
Full Stock Payment and Pooling Accounting Abolishment

Difference-in-Differences Tests
In this section, we explicitly test whether pooling abolishment is a valid candidate for explaining the evolution in full stock payments in the U.S. The difference-in-differences test, with
Canada as a counterfactual, should be robust to misspecification-based sources of bias, including endogenous missing variables (Roberts and Whited 2013) . The statistical robustness of this approach depends on the validity of the counterfactual. The stylized facts in Section 2 and the M&A accounting principles summarized in Section 3 strongly advocate for this validity. Accordingly, we adopt two difference-in-differences specifications (Greene, 2011 ):
where is the deal index, is a dummy variable equal to 1 for a full stock payment for deal , is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer is a U.S. firm but 0 if the acquirer is a Canadian firm, is dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal announcement date is during the post period (after 30/06/2001), is a vector of sector fixed effects (defined at the SIC two-digit level), is a vector of year fixed effects, and is vector of control variables. We use bold notation to identify vectors. The set of control variables is the same as in Table 4 .
Our two difference-in-differences specifications are linear probability models (LPM), which are generally less well suited to the analysis of binary dependent variables than probit or logit specifications. However, we selected this estimator because Equations 2 and 3 both incorporate interaction terms. Coefficients of interaction terms in nonlinear models cannot be interpreted as marginal effects (Greene, 2010) , but in a linear specification, they are. Adopting LPM specifications therefore facilitates the interpretation of our results. 12 The Equation 2 specification is a classic difference-in-differences test implementation in a multivariate context. We also report the results obtained with the Equation 3 specification, because including year fixed effects controls for timevarying common factors that are not explicitly included in the vector of control variables (e.g., macroeconomic variables). The dummy cannot be included in this second specification though, because it is a linear combination of the set of year fixed effects.
In Table 5 , we report the results from estimating Equations 2 and 3 in the first two columns.
The M&A sample is the one we introduced in Section 1, though restricted to transactions for which all the required data fields are available. We stacked the U.S. and Canadian M&A transactions to support the difference-in-differences tests. All control variables are as defined in Appendix 1.
The test of the pooling abolishment hypothesis relied on the interaction term × with coefficient for Equations 2 and 3. In Table 5 , Column 1, the coefficient value is -.3134 (p = .00), and in Column 2, it is -.2099 (p = .00). These estimates strongly support the pooling abolishment hypothesis: In contrast with the Canadian experience, full stock payments declined in the U.S. in the wake of the pooling abolishment. The result is robust to our introduction of a large set of determinants of the M&A mode of payment, industry-level latent factors that were constant over time, and annual common latent factors. The properties of the difference-in-differences specification also make it robust to any latent factors common to the U.S. and Canada. Moreover, the sizable coefficient values indicated a decline of 20 to 30 pp in the probability of a full stock payment during the post period. 13 Finally, among the control variables, in comparison with the results obtained for the U.S. during 1990-2014 (Table 4) , the coefficients of acquirer leverage, market-to-book ratio, tangibility, dividend, R&D, domestic transaction, public target, and 10-year interest rate kept their signs and statistical significance.
Additional Evidence
CEO Incentives and Full Stock Payment Probability
Pooling and purchase methods of accounting have significantly different consequences for the new merged entity, in terms of its displayed financial ratios (Reda 1999) . Executives whose compensation packages depended on financial performance indicators such as EPS or ROA had clear incentives to opt for full stock payments during the pooling period. Consistently, Aboody et al. (2000) report that pooling was more likely in large target
Step-Up transactions when managers received earnings-based compensation. These CEO incentives therefore might provide a channel to explain the interaction between pooling and the choice of payment methods in M&A transactions.
To study their role, we computed the percentage of variable compensation the CEO received, with data from the Execucomp database. We next reproduced the LPM of the full stock payment in the U.S. (Table 4 ) but added the percentage of variable CEO compensation and its interaction with the 13 These results are confirmed in Appendix 2, using a probit specification. The interpretation of the interaction term coefficients must be handled with care in this nonlinear context (Greene 2010 ), but we note that the coefficients are negative and highly significant in both specifications (Column 1, -1.0183, p = .00; Column 2 -.6918, p = .00).
Post pool dummy variable. 14 The sample size decreased drastically (from 5,337 observations to 1,146), due to the limited data availability in the Execucomp database. When the CEOs of acquirers earn a high proportion of variable compensation, they avoid full stock payments in the years since the pooling abolishment.
These results suggest that CEO incentives help explain the interaction between pooling abolishment and the marginalization of full stock payments in the U.S. When we compare the Column 1 results with those in Columns 2 and 3, we find that half of the post-pooling abolishment effect was due to CEO incentives. That is, in Column 1, the Post pool coefficient is -.4358, and in Columns 2 and 3, it shrinks to -.2382 and -.259 respectively, or roughly half.
Classic Determinants of M&A Mode of Payment
Can the marginalization of full stock payments in the U.S. be explained by the determinants of the M&A mode of payment classically used in M&A literature? To investigate this question, we study the predictive power of the determinants during the post period, using an empirical strategy similar to Boone et al.'s (2014) : we model the probability of full stock payments using an LPM specification and the set of determinants in Table 3 . The estimates of the LPM model coefficients rely on the subsample of transactions that took place during the pooling period. We then use those estimated coefficients to obtain the fitted probability of full stock payments, during both the pooling and post periods. Finally, we average the deal level fitted probabilities, year by year. 15 Table 7 [1990] [1991] [1992] , for which our sample is very limited (Section 1), the LPM captures the average probability of full stock payments correctly, but in this case, it can do so for both the pooling and post periods. The post result is remarkable: In Canada, despite the pooling abolishment, stock payment drivers remained stable over the analyzed 25 years. These observations lead us to conclude that the known determinants of stock payments do not drive the full stock payment marginalization in the U.S. after 2001, in confirmation of Boone et al.'s (2014) results. Because participation in the M&A market is a voluntary decision, endogenous self-selection may affect these results. We therefore replicated the exercise using a twostage Heckman procedure, but the results were similar (available on request).
Classic Determinants of M&A Mode of Payment: Pooling versus Post-Pooling Periods
The results in Table 7 also offer an opportunity to compare the classic determinants' coefficients across the pooling and post periods. In each panel of Table 7 , we report estimates for the pooling (left) and post (right) periods, as well as the test of coefficient differences. In the U.S. (Table 7 
Probability of Full Stock Payment and Pooling
If pooling was a main motivation to pay in stock during 1990-2001 in the U.S., acquirers who would have chosen pooling should not pay more frequently in stock than other acquirers do after the pooling abolishment. We test this prediction using a two-stage approach. In the first stage, we estimate the probability of pooling during the pooling period. In the second stage, using fitted probabilities of pooling obtained from the first-stage estimates, we study whether the probability of pooling still explains full stock payments during the post period. The first-stage estimated equation is
where is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the transaction was recognized under pooling, Φ(. )
indicates a probit specification, and is a set of control variables that explains the choice to structure an acquisition to make it eligible for pooling. Ayers (2002) highlights the role of the target's
Step-Up, ROA, and leverage. In turn, we selected a probit specification, because there is no interaction term in Equation 4.
In the second stage, similar to the analyses reported in Table 5 , we tested two LPM specifications, one without year fixed effects and one with them:
The variable ℎ refers to the fitted probabilities of pooling, obtained using Equation 4.
Finally, , the coefficient of the interaction terms × ℎ , is the coefficient of interest. Ayers (2002) , the target's Step-Up, ROA, and leverage have significant roles. The greater its
Step-Up and ROA, the higher the probability of pooling; the higher the target's leverage, the lower the probability of pooling, reflecting the acquirer's desire to avoid degrading its financial ratios. Other control variables also are significant, including the target's size (positive coefficient) and the acquirer's dividend (negative coefficient), run up (positive coefficient), and membership in manufacturing industries (negative coefficient). The former is positive and highly significant in both specifications (Column 1, .9336, p = .00; Column 2, .8419, p = .00). Acquirers interested in pooling selected full stock payments more often. This finding must be the case, because full stock payment was a necessary condition for pooling (Section 3). The coefficient of × ℎ also was negative and highly significant (Column 1, -1.1326, p = .00; Column 2, -.9740, p = .00). When we add the coefficients of ℎ and × ℎ to obtain the net effect of ℎ during the post period, we obtain a value close to 0 (not significantly different from 0 at p = .29; unreported result). We would expect such a result if pooling was a main reason to select full stock payment. That is, acquirers wishing to opt for pooling had no more opportunity to do so during the post period, so they stopped paying in stock more frequently than other acquirers.
Value Effects
Fuller et al. (2002) and Officer et al. (2009) show that the mode of payment interacts with the target status to determine acquirer value creation in M&A transactions. The most value-creating transactions for acquirers are those of private targets paid in stock. Private target acquisitions are more value creating for acquirers than are public ones, possibly because of the presence of an illiquidity premium captured by acquirers. Moreover, relative to cash payments, the use of stock payments enables acquirer and target shareholders to share the valuation uncertainty that exists due to the absence of an active secondary market. The acquisition of public targets paid in stock instead is the most valuedestroying combination, because it combines a size effect with a share exchange offer, both of which generate negative investor reactions (Golubov et al. 2015b; Moeller et al. 2004 ).
Our results show that the abolishment of pooling in 2001 (SFAS 141) represents the main explanation for why full stock payments were marginalized in the U.S. after 2001. In Section 5.3 we detailed how the stock-paid transaction characteristics and corresponding acquirer profiles changed after the pooling abolishment. Here, we investigate whether these changes affected investors' perceptions of the value creation surrounding the transactions.
We start by computing the acquirer CAR for our U.S. sample (see Section 1). We use the standard market model as a return-generating process, estimated on a window from day -300 to day -90, with respect to the announcement date. The acquirer CAR are for a three-day event window, centered on the announcement date. We then regressed acquirer CAR on the set of classical determinants (Golubov et al. 2015a ) and dummy variables that capture the post-pooling period (Post pool ), the target's status (public target), and full stock payment (stock). that acquiring public targets is negatively perceived by investors, and the effect gets reinforced by full stock payments. We add the dummy variables-post, public target, and stock-and their interactions in Column 2. The × Stock × Public Target interaction coefficient is negative and highly significant (-.0463, p = .01), indicating that investors react far more negatively to acquisition announcements for public targets with full payment in stock in the period since the pooling abolishment.
Noting that fully stock-paid transactions display significant changes in acquirer profiles and deal characteristics in the post period (Section 5.3), we determine that the pooling abolishment has transformed this segment of M&A activity. Only less value-creating or more value-destroying transactions of public targets continue to be fully paid in stock, and full stock payment conveys more negative private information about acquirers.
Robustness Checks
We investigate the robustness of the Table 5 results, reflecting our baseline difference-indifferences test of the pooling abolishment hypothesis, to various issues that could lead to misleading conclusions. To start, 2001 was the year SFAS 141 and 142 were adopted, but also the year the Internet bubble burst. Did this contemporaneous event drive our results? In Table 10 , Panel A, we present a replication of the Table 5 tests after we excluded high-tech firms, which we identified using Kile and Phillips's (2009) method. These authors provide a detailed list of four-digit SIC industries that can be considered high-tech. After excluding them, our sample size dropped from 6,123 observations in Table   5 to 3,273 observations in Table 10 . The coefficients of the U.S. dummy  Post pool dummy interaction term remained negative and highly significant (Column 1, -.2410, p = .00; Column 2, -.1777, p = .00).
The bursting of the Internet bubble thus is not a confounding factor. This result also indicates that pooling relevance during the 1990s was not restricted to high-tech industries, as was frequently suggested by the financial press at the time.
If cross-border transactions are asymmetrically distributed between the U.S. and Canada and also underwent specific time trends after 2001, they also could act as confounding factors. We replicated our preceding analysis, but this time we excluded cross-border transactions. The results in Table 10 , Panel B, stem from a sample size of 5,174 transactions. The coefficients of the U.S. dummy  Post pool dummy interaction term became even more negative and highly significant (Column 1, -.3693, p = .00;
Column 2, -.2214, p = .00).
The pooling and post-pooling subsamples of acquirers each incorporate a reduced number of identical firms. As we reported in Section 5.3, in the U.S., the determinants of full stock payment underwent significant changes between the two periods. Might this variation in the composition of the acquirer samples affect the estimation results? To check, we selected a subsample of U.S. acquirers that undertook at least one transaction in the five years before the pooling abolishment and another transaction in the five years following it. We refer to this subsample as the constant acquirer sample, and we present the pertinent results in Table 10 , Panel C. The sample size dropped drastically to 971
observations. The coefficients of the U.S. dummy  Post pool dummy interaction term remained negative and highly significant again (Column 1, -.3431, p = .00; Column 2, -.2079, p = .00).
Many Canadian companies are listed on U.S. capital markets, as well as Canadian markets, which defines them as cross-listed firms. If the cross-listing decision was motivated by the search for easier conditions for pooling in the U.S., the presence of these cross-listed firms could affect our results. 17 We check the robustness of our The use of pooling was very limited in European countries, whether because it was forbidden by country-specific regulations or because of their restrictive conditions, similar to those in Canada.
18
Europe therefore qualifies as another valid counterfactual for our difference-in-differences test. We extracted, from Thomson SDC, M&A transactions completed by European acquirers, using the same criteria we described in Section 1. The resulting sample of 6,285 transactions involved companies in 41
European countries, though U.K. firms account for more than 58%. In Figure 4 , we present the yearly A main contribution of our analyses is the demonstrated use of difference-in-differences tests with valid counterfactuals. In Section 3, we detailed the U.S. and Canadian accounting regulations to explain why Canada was so well suited to serve as a counterfactual; in this section, we describe how Europe is qualified as well. In turn, we apply a classic treatment effect test for the pooling abolishment hypothesis, avoiding non-U.S. transactions as the counterfactual. Specifically, -For a given M&A transaction, we define the treatment as the announcement date, taking place during the post period.
-We use propensity score-matching estimators to impute the missing counterfactual for each transaction as the outcome of the most similar transaction that also took place during the pooling period. The outcome of this transaction is the potential outcome.
-We compute the treatment effect by taking the average of the difference between the observed and potential outcomes for each subject.
A detailed presentation of this procedure is available from Roberts and Whited (2013) . We used acquirer and transaction characteristics to estimate the treatment model. an additional US x interaction term in our difference-in-differences specification. As the results in Table 10 , Panel H, reveal, the US  coefficient remains negative and strongly significant in both difference-in-differences specifications, whereas the US x interaction coefficient is significant only in the specification with year fixed effects (p = .09). The previous results thus are robust to the SEC Rule 10b-18 share repurchases safe harbor amendments of 2003.
Conclusion
This analysis of the evolution of full stock payments in M&A transactions in the U. Table 1 . % Stock refers to the observed percentage. Estimated % Stock is obtained using the fitted probabilities from the linear probability models in Table 7, Table 4 . Determinants of the probability of full stock payment Table 4 displays the results of a linear probability model of full stock payments using the set of mode of payment choice determinants classically used in prior literature (Eckbo et al. 2014 Table 6 . CEO incentives and the probability of full stock payment Table 7 . Determinants of the probability of full stock payment Table 7 displays the results of a linear probability model of full stock payment using the set of mode of payment choice determinants classically used in prior literature (Eckbo et al. 2014 ) by sub-period (pooling and post-pooling abolishment periods Table 8 reports the results of a two-stage analysis of the relation between the probability of full stock payment and the probability of pooling. The M&A sample for the U.S. is introduced in Table 1 ; the variables are defined in Appendix 1. Panel A presents the first-stage probability of pooling analysis. The dependent variable is the pooling dummy variable (=1 in the case of pooling). We adopt a classic probit specification. Control variables are selected in accordance with existing literature about pooling accounting (Ayers et al. 2002) . The estimation is performed on the pooling period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) . Panel B is dedicated to the second-stage probability of full stock payment analysis. The dependent variable is the full stock payment dummy variable. Both specifications rely on a linear probability model. In Column 1, the Post pool Dummy variable is explicitly introduced. In Column 2, we introduce year fixed effects (Year FE). Pooling Hat is the fitted probability of pooling accounting, obtained using the firststage probability of pooling analysis. Post pool x Pooling Hat is the interaction term between the Post pool dummy variable and Pooling Hat. The set of control variables is the same as in Table 9 reports the results of cross-sectional regressions of acquirer CAR on a large set of determinants classically used in prior literature (Golubov et al. 2015a) , dummy variables identifying the post-pooling abolishment period (Post pool ), fully stock paid acquisitions (Stock), public targets (Public Target), and their interactions. The M&A sample for the U.S. is introduced in Table 1 , and the variables are defined in Appendix 1. The CAR are obtained using the market model as a return-generating process (estimation window from day -300 to day -90 relative to the announcement date) and a three-day event window centered on the announcement date. Column 1 displays the results for the baseline specification. 
Sigma
Standard deviation of the market adjusted daily returns of the acquirer stock over a 200 day window (from day minus two-hundreds and ten to day minus eleven relative to the announcement date)
CRSP
Step Up
Step-up in target book value, equals to deal value minus target Book Equity (Compustat item CEQ) divided by target Book Equity 
SDC, Compustat
Stock
